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ABSTRACT
We propose Secure Pick Up (SPU), a convenient, lightweight, in-
device, non-intrusive and automatic-learning system for smartphone
user authentication. Operating in the background, our system im-
plicitly observes users’ phone pick-up movements, the way they
bend their arms when they pick up a smartphone to interact with
the device, to authenticate the users.
Our SPU outperforms the state-of-the-art implicit authentica-
tionmechanisms in threemain aspects: 1) SPU automatically learns
the user’s behavioral paern without requiring a large amount of
training data (especially those of other users) as previous methods
did, making it more deployable. Towards this end, we propose a
weighted multi-dimensional Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algo-
rithm to effectively quantify similarities between users’ pick-up
movements; 2) SPU does not rely on a remote server for provid-
ing further computational power, making SPU efficient and usable
even without network access; and 3) our system can adaptively
update a user’s authentication model to accommodate user’s be-
havioral dri over time with negligible overhead.
rough extensive experiments on real world datasets, we demon-
strate that SPU can achieve authentication accuracy up to 96.3%
with a very low latency of 2.4 milliseconds. It reduces the number
of times a user has to do explicit authentication by 32.9%, while
effectively defending against various aacks.
KEYWORDS
Authentication; Security; Privacy; Machine Learning; Smartphone;
Dynamic Time Warping; Mobile System
1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets are rapidly becom-
ing our means for entering the Internet and online social networks.
ey also store sensitive and personal information, such as email
addresses or bank account information of users. e hardware of
today’s mobile devices is quite capable with multi-core gigahertz
processors, and gigabytes of memory and solid-state storage. eir
relatively low cost, ease of use and ‘always on’ connectivity pro-
vide a suitable platform for many day-to-day tasks involving fi-
nancial transactions and sensitive data, making mobile devices at-
tractive aack targets (e.g., see aacks against the Apple iOS and
Google Android platforms in [24]).
Passwords are currently one of themost common forms for user
authentication in mobile devices. However, they suffer from sev-
eral weaknesses. Passwords are vulnerable to guessing aacks
[2, 14, 22, 39, 40] or password reuse [7]. e usability issue is also a
serious factor, since users do not like to have to enter, and reenter,
passwords [32, 35]. A recent study in [5] shows that 64% of users
do not use passwords or PINs as an authentication mechanism on
their smartphones.
Recently, more andmore smartphones are equippedwith finger-
print scanners, making authentication through fingerprints quite
popular. However, suchmechanisms also suffer from several weak-
nesses. It is possible to trick the scanner by using a gelatin print
mold over a real finger. In addition, the response time for the fin-
gerprint scanner to unlock the smartphone is oen more than one
second [27], degrading the usability of fingerprint-based authenti-
cation.
Other biometric-based authenticationmechanisms (e.g., via face
and keystroke dynamics) are also unreliable and vulnerable to forgery
aacks [36, 37]. For instance, an aacker can obtain a photo of
the targeted user (e.g., via Facebook) and present it in front of the
camera to spoof face recognition on smartphones. Furthermore,
these authentication mechanisms require frequent user participa-
tion, hindering their deployment in real world scenarios. Hence, it
is important to design secure and convenient authentication meth-
ods for smartphone users, the topic of this paper.
Behavior-based authenticationmechanisms are recently proposed
to implement convenient and implicit authentication which does
not require frequent user participation and can reduce the user’s
efforts (e.g., the number of times) needed to unlock their smart-
phones. Behavior-based authentication is increasingly gaining pop-
ularity since mobile devices are oen equipped with sensors such
as accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, camera, microphone,
GPS and so on. Implicit authentication relies on a distinguishable
behavioral paern of the user, which is accomplished by build-
ing the users’ profiles [4, 6, 9, 10, 15–20, 26, 29, 32, 38, 43]. If a
newly-detected user behavior is consistent with the behavior pro-
file stored in the smartphone, the device will have high confidence
that no explicit authentication action is required. Otherwise, if
the newly-detected behavior deviates significantly from the stored
behavior profile, alternative explicit authentication mechanisms
should be triggered, such as requiring the user to enter a password,
PIN or checking his/her fingerprint.
Existing behavior-based authentication systems exploitmachine
learning techniques to achieve good security performance [4, 10,
18, 19, 38, 43]. However, these systems have several limitations
for real world user authentication: 1) they need a large amount of
training data (including other users’ data) to learn an authentica-
tion classifier, which may violate users’ privacy and thus hinder
users’ motivation to utilize these systems; 2) their training process
is usually computationally complicated, which requires additional
computational services, e.g., cloud computing, thus requiring users
to trust the remote server and always have network connection; 3)
their system updating process for capturing the user’s behavioral
dri over time is also quite complex.
Other behavior-based authentication mechanisms exploit spe-
cific contexts of users’ behavior, e.g., how do users walk [26], and
how do users answer a phone call [6], for authentication. However,
their corresponding experiments require users to follow restricted
paerns for authentication, e.g., walk straight ahead at the same
speed [26] or answer a call when the phone is on a table in front of
a user [6]. ese constraints are unrealistic for extracting effective
behavior paerns of users, making these systems impractical for
real world authentication.
To address these issues, we propose a lightweight, in-device,
non-intrusive and automatic-learning authentication system, called
Secure Pick Up (SPU), which can be broadly deployed in real world
mobile devices. Our system aims to utilize a simple and general be-
havioral paern of smartphone users, the way people bend their
arms when they pick up a phone to interact with the device, to
implicitly authenticate the users. For a smartphone that installs
our SPU application, the device starts extracting a user’s pick-up
paern from his/her arm movements when picking up a phone,
and then the system determines whether the current user is legit-
imate or not. If the user’s current behavior conforms to the estab-
lished behavior profile stored in the smartphone, the user passes
the authentication and can have access to the smartphone. If the
user’s current behavior deviates from the established behavior pro-
file, the device would present explicit authentication challenges,
e.g., input of a password, PIN or fingerprint. If these backup ex-
plicit authentication mechanisms pass, the user is allowed access
to the smartphone and the user’s profile stored in the smartphone
is updated consequently; otherwise, the user is denied access. is
paper aims to answer the question of whether we could build and
deploy such a model in a practical, convenient and secure manner
on today’s mobile devices. Our key contributions include:
• Wedesign a behavior-based implicit authentication system, SPU,
by exploiting users’ behavioral paerns recorded by smartphone
sensors when they bend their arms to pick up a phone. SPU can
automatically learn a user’s behavioral paern in an accurate,
efficient and stealthy manner. Furthermore, SPU does not re-
quire a large amount of training data of other users as previous
work did, making our system easier to deploy in real world ap-
plications.
• Our system (including the profile updating process) can be im-
plemented efficiently and entirely on personal smartphones. It
does not require any additional computational services, e.g., cloud
computing. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first using
only a device’s resources for implicit authentication, making
SPU efficient and usable even without network access. For in-
stance, our system can adaptively update the user’s authenti-
cation model over time with rather low overhead, consuming
negligible power of 2%.
• We propose an effective Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algo-
rithm to quantify similarities between users’ pick-up paerns.
More specifically, wemodify the traditional DTWalgorithm and
propose a weighted multi-dimensional DTW technique to ac-
commodate the multiple dimensions of sensor data in our set-
ting, and to further improve authentication performance. Exten-
sive experimental results verify the effectiveness of our method
which can achieve high accuracy up to 96.3% in 2.4 milliseconds.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that SPU can reduce a user’s ef-
forts by 32.9% to unlock his/her smartphone providing a more
user-friendly experience and encouraging more users to protect
access to their devices.
• Finally, our system is robust to various types of aackers, in-
cluding the serious ones that observe victims’ behaviors many
times. For instance, our SPU can achieve 0% false acceptance
rate (FAR) and 18% false rejection rate (FRR) for authenticating
smartphone users under the worst case mimicry aacks (edu-
cated aacks).
2 SYSTEM DESIGN
e main objective of our SPU system is to increase the conve-
nience for smartphone users by reducing their efforts (e.g., the
number of times) to unlock the smartphone while guaranteeing
their security through preventing unauthorized access to the smart-
phone. We now describe the threat model, design goals, key ideas
and system architecture for SPU.
2.1 reat Model
Compared to personal computers, smartphones are more easily
lost or stolen, giving aackers more opportunity to obtain the sen-
sitive data stored in the smartphones. We assume that the aack-
ers have physical access to the smartphone and can even moni-
tor and mimic the user’s pick-up behavior. erefore, they can
launch mimicry aacks, to impersonate the legitimate user’s be-
havior. Specifically, we consider three different levels of aacks as
follows.
• Random Aack (RA): With no prior knowledge of the user’s
pick-up behavior, a RA aacker randomly picks up the smart-
phone and wishes to pass the authentication system. is is
equivalent to a brute force aack against text-based password
schemes.
• Context-Aware Aack (CAA): In a context-aware aack, an ad-
versary knows the place where the user picks up his/her smart-
phone, but has not observed how the user does it.
• Educated Aack (EA): In an educated aack, an adversary has
observed how and where the user picks up his/her smartphone.
In our SPU system, we consider a single-user model, which is in
line with current smartphone usage scenarios. Formulti-user mod-
els, our system can be generalized in a straightforward manner to
incorporatemultiple profiles (e.g., family members, guests) for pro-
gressive authentication as discussed in [21, 25]. Furthermore, we
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assume the availability of low-cost sensors inmobile devices for de-
tecting a user’s presence and behavior. Indeed, the sensors used in
our implementation are the accelerometer and gyroscope, which
are widely available in today’s mobile devices. As more sensors
become pervasive, they can easily be folded into our system.
2.2 Design Goals
Our system is designed to increase the convenience of smartphone
users while guaranteeing their security, through implicitly authen-
ticating the users in an unobtrusive manner. Furthermore, the
whole authentication process should be implemented stealthily and
efficiently. Overall, our design goals for the SPU system are:
• Accurate: the authentication system should not incorrectly au-
thenticate a user.
• Rapid Enrollment and Updating: creating new user accounts or
updating pick-up profiles for existing users should be quick.
• Rapid Authentication: the response time for the authentication
system must be short, for the system to be usable in reality.
• Implicit: the authentication system should neither interrupt user-
smartphone interactions nor need explicit user participation dur-
ing the authentication process.
• Unobtrusive: the authentication system should be completely
unobtrusive and should not invade the user’s privacy; the user
should be comfortable when using our system.
• Light-weight: the authentication system should not require in-
tensive computations.
• Device only: the authentication system should work efficiently
and entirely on mobile devices only even without network ac-
cess. It should not depend on auxiliary training data of other
users or additional computational capabilities, e.g., cloud com-
puting.
2.3 Key Ideas
Our SPU system is designed to achieve all the design goals in Sec-
tion 2.2. To increase the convenience for users and detect unautho-
rized access to the smartphone as soon as possible, it is required
that we authenticate the users when they start using the smart-
phone. erefore, we consider using the users’ arm movements
when they pick up their smartphones as a distinguishable behavior
to authenticate the users. Our key idea stems from the observation
that users’ behavioral paerns are different from person to person
when they start using their smartphones, from the time they pick
up the phone to the time they press the home buon or power but-
ton. More specifically, we extract the ‘pick-up signal’ from the
user’s arm movements measured by sensors (accelerometer and
gyroscope) embedded in the smartphone.
To extract users’ pick-upmovements, we first define a particular
user action and call it a ‘trigger-action’. Here, we utilize the ‘wake
up’ signal of a smartphone such as pressing the home buon or
power buon in the sleep mode, as the trigger action 1. Whenever
a trigger-action is performed, we extract the pick-up signal from
the measurements of the accelerometer and gyroscope (described
below). at is to say, our system authenticates the user only when
1In our experiments, we used the home buon or power buon as the ‘trigger-action’.
Our method can be easily integrated with new trigger-actions, e.g., the automatic
wake-up feature in the iphone 7.
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Figure 1: A real world instance of a user’s pick-up move-
ment. When a wake up signal is detected (home button or
power button is pressed in the sleepmode) corresponding to
the end point tend , we backtrack the sensor measurements
to find the begin point tbeдin aer detecting a flat signal last-
ing a period of tf .
the smartphone is triggered to wake up from the sleep mode. Note
that there is no necessity to authenticate the user when the smart-
phone is locked.
Figure 1 shows a real world instance for the extracted signal
stream that describes a user’s pick-up movements from measure-
ments collected by the accelerometer. When our system detects
the home buon signal or power buon signal during the sleep
mode, we record the time as the end of the pick-up signal tend ,
and back-track the accelerometer measurements to construct the
pick-up signal. If we detect a flat signal lasting for a time period of
tf , we consider the end time of the flat signal as the beginning of
the pick-up signal tbeдin as shown in Figure 1.
In order to backtrack the pick-up signal, we need to record the
entire time-series measurements of the accelerometer and gyro-
scope, while the smartphone is in the sleep mode. In Section 6, we
will show that this sensor measurement process is efficient, only
costing an additional 2% in power consumption of the smartphone.
Note that we only consider authenticating pick-up movements
from a stable state in our SPU system. We will show in Section 5.2
that this type of pick-upmovement (from a stable state) constitutes
the most important pick-up characteristic of users.
Aer extracting the pick-up signal, we propose aweightedmulti-
dimensional Dynamic TimeWarping algorithm to effectively quan-
tify similarities between users’ pick up movements for authenti-
cation (detailed process will be discussed in Section 4.2.2). More
specifically, we modify the traditional DTW algorithm to accom-
modate themulti-dimensional sensor data in our seing, to further
improve authentication performance.
We will show the distinguishable properties of users’ pick-up
paerns in Section 5. We will show that the pick-up signals are
still distinguishable even under impersonation aacks in Section
5.3. Furthermore, our SPU system can significantly reduce users’
efforts to unlock their smartphones as will be discussed in Sec-
tion 5.4.
Unlike previous work, our SPU does not require a large amount
of training data for learning a complex authentication classifier,
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Figure 2: e flowchart of our SPU system.
and any additional computational capability of cloud servers, there-
fore more users would be motivated to use our system. In addi-
tion, our system can be easily combined with the state-of-the-art
re-authentication systems [15, 16, 19, 38] to further improve the
security of the smartphone.
2.4 System Architecture
Our system is designed for today’s smartphoneswhich are equipped
with rich sensing capabilities. It could also be generally applied to
tablets and other types of wearable devices such as smartwatches.
Figure 2 shows the flowchart of our SPU system. System operation
is in four phases:
Enrollment: When a user first enrolls in our SPU system, he/she
is asked to pick up his/her smartphone in the same way as in
his/her normal life. Our system then establishes the user’s pick-
up profile by extracting the pick-up signal and storing it in the
smartphone.
Extractingpick-up signals: Our system keepsmonitoring and
recording the measurements of the accelerometer and gyroscope
when the smartphone is in the sleep mode until it is picked up.
We extract the pick-up signals from these sensor measurements in
the enrollment phase and aerwards (detailed process discussed in
Section 2.3).
Authentication: Aer extracting the pick-up signal, we com-
pare the new incoming measurements (signal) with the user’s pick-
up profile stored in the smartphone byutilizing our proposedweighted
multi-dimensional DTWtechnique (will be discussed in Section 4.2.2).
Post-Authentication: If the pick-up signal is authenticated as
coming from the legitimate user, this testing passes and the current
user can access the information and resources in the smartphone.
Otherwise, the smartphone would request an explicit authentica-
tion, e.g., password, PIN or fingerprint, from the current user. We
emphasize, however, that the desired response to such situations
is a maer of policy. Furthermore, the stored user’s profile will be
updated to accommodate the user’s behavioral dri if the correct
explicit authentication is provided. Otherwise, no access to the
smartphone is allowed.
3 DATA COLLECTION
3.1 Sensor Selection
ere are various built-in sensors in today’s smartphones, from
which we aim to choose a small set of sensors that can accurately
represent a user’s pick-up behavioral paern. In this paper, we
consider the following two sensors that are commonly embeded in
current smartphones: the accelerometer and the gyroscope [11].
ese two sensors represent different levels of information about
the user’s behavior, and are oen called a 6-axis motion detec-
tor. e accelerometer records larger motion paerns of users
such as how they move their arms or walk [26], while the gyro-
scope records fine-grained motions of users such as how they hold
the smartphone [42]. Furthermore, these sensors do not require
the user’s permission when requested by mobile applications [12],
making them useful for background monitoring as in our implicit
authentication systems.
3.2 Dataset Collection
We utilize the open-source Android system as our implementation
platform. We develop an Android application to implement SPU
on Andriod smartphones. Note that our methods are not limited
to this platform and can be easily applied to other platforms such
as the Apple iOS platform on an iPhone.
In our experiments, each data sample is a time-series measure-
ment collected by the accelerometer and gyroscope, which cap-
tures the user’s behavioral paern when picking up the smart-
phone. In our user study, we consider three experimental scenarios
and describe the detailed seings for each experiment as follows.
All the participants were shown the app that is installed in their
phones. All of the participants volunteered to participate in our
experiments. ere is no security breach on users’ data in smart-
phones since we collect data and do the authentication aempts
offline.
e first experiment was conducted under a lab seing, aim-
ing to provide fundamental intuition for our SPU system. We col-
lected sensor data from 24 users whose detailed demographics are
described in Section 5.1. We asked each user to pick up the smart-
phone in 6 different places while siing or standing 2. For each sce-
nario, we collected 10 samples of the pick-up movement for each
user, under the 12 situations (6 places × 2 user states). erefore,
we collected 2, 880 (i.e., 24 × 12 × 10) pick-up samples in total. We
will describe the detailed analysis for the first experiment in Sec-
tion 5.1.
e second experiment was conducted under a more realistic
seing which is designed to verify the effectiveness of our SPU
system in real world applications. e same 24 users were invited
to install our application on their own smartphones and use them
freely in their normal lives for a week. From the collected data, we
extracted 3, 115 pick-up movement samples for these users. We
will analyze the overall authentication performance of our system
in real world scenarios in Section 5.2.
22 places are at a user’s right hand side, another 2 places are in front of the user, and
another 2 places are at a user’s le hand side. In each of these three directions, one
place is close while the other place is far.
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Our third experiment was designed to analyze the security per-
formance of SPU in defending against multiple aacks (e.g., imper-
sonation aacks) as discussed in Section 2.1. In this experiment,
we randomly select 6 out of the 24 users as victims and randomly
select 12 out of the other 18 users (different from the victims) as
adversaries. e experimental seing is the same as the first ex-
periment. e only difference is that the adversaries are trying to
mimic the victims under different levels of prior knowledge. Specif-
ically, these adversaries perform the three aacks in Section 2.1
respectively, and the detailed aack processes are described as fol-
lows:
• Random Aack (RA): e random aacker tries to use the vic-
tim’s smartphone without knowing any information about the
victim. In total, we collected 12 × 6 × 10 = 720 samples3 of the
pick-up signals under the random aack.
• Context-Aware Aack (CAA): We provided a context-aware at-
tacker who is informed of the place where the victim picked up
the smartphone. Note that these aackers have not observed
how the victim picked up the smartphone. We also collected
720 pick-up samples under the context-aware aack.
• Educated Aack (EA): e victim user’s behavior was recorded
by a VCR and is clearly visible to the aacker. e aacker was
asked to watch the video and mimic the victim’s behavior to
the best of his/her ability. In total, we also collected 720 pick-up
samples under the educated aack.
We will discuss the security analysis for the third experiment in
Section 5.3.
4 SPU AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHMS
We now describe the design of our authentication algorithmwhich
aims to achieve the design goals in Section 2.2.
Previous implicit authentication algorithms exploitmachine learn-
ing techniques to achieve good authentication performance [4, 10,
18, 19, 26, 38, 43]. However, we identify characteristics that the
smartphone implicit authentication exhibits that are notwell aligned
with the requirements of machine-learning techniques. ese in-
clude: 1) lack of training data especially those of other users; 2)
fundamental limitations in computation capabilities for the train-
ing process and the updating process.
To overcome these challenges, we aim to design an implicit,
lightweight and in-device authentication algorithm by matching
the new incoming pick-up signal with the pick-up profile stored
in the smartphone, instead of the complicated machine learning
techniques of previous methods. Furthermore, the time duration
of a pick-up movement varies across time and across users, and
typically is within the range of 0.5 to 4 seconds. erefore, our
matching process should also automatically cope with time defor-
mations and different speeds associated with time-dependent sen-
sor data.
Towards these goals, we consider using the dynamic time warp-
ing technique [23] to carefully measure the distance between two
time-series sensor data which may vary in time or speed. In DTW,
the sequences are warped in a nonlinear fashion to match each
other. It has been successfully applied to compare different speech
3In our experiments, we considered 12 aackers, 6 victims and 10 repeated iterations
for each user’s pick-up movement.
paerns in automatic speech recognition and other applications
in the data mining community. Furthermore, we propose an effec-
tive weighted multi-dimensional DTW to accommodate our set-
ting where the collected sensor data are of multiple dimensions,
thus taking the different distinguishing power of each sensor di-
mension into consideration.
4.1 Data Pre-processing
Our system keeps monitoring and collecting the measurements
of the accelerometer and gyroscope in the background, while the
smartphone is in sleep mode. When the wake up signal (e.g., home
buon or power buon is pressed in the sleep mode) is detected,
our SPU records the time as the ending of the pick-up signal and
back-tracks the collected data to find the beginning of the pick-up
signal, as described earlier in Section 2.3.
4.2 DTW-based Authentication Algorithm
4.2.1 One-Dimensional DTW. DTW is a well-known technique
to find the optimal alignment between two given (time-dependent)
sequencesX := (x1, x2, . . . ,xN ) of lengthN ∈ N andY := (y1,y2, . . . ,yM )
of length M ∈ N under certain restrictions. While there is a sur-
feit of possible distance measures for time-series data, empirical
evidence has shown that DTW is exceptionally difficult to beat.
Ding et al. in [8] tested the most cited distance measures on 47
different datasets, and no method consistently outperforms DTW.
erefore, in our system, we utilize DTW to measure the distance
between users’ pick-up signals.
DTW calculates the distance of two sequences using dynamic
programming [1]. It constructs an N -by-M matrix, where the (i, j)-
th element is the minimum distance (called local distance) between
the two sequences that end at points xi and yj respectively. An
(N ,M)-warping pathp = (p1,p2, · · · ,pL) is a contiguous set of ma-
trix elements which defines an alignment between two sequences
X and Y by aligning the element xnl of X to the element yml of
Y . e boundary condition enforces that the first elements of X
and Y as well as the last elements of X and Y are aligned to each
other. e total distance dp (X ,Y ) of a warping path p between X
and Y with respect to the local distance measure d is defined as
dp (X ,Y ) =
∑L
l=1
d(xnl ,yml ). erefore, the DTW for one dimen-
sional time-series data can be computed as
DTW1(X ,Y ) = mindp (X ,Y ) (1)
4.2.2 Multi-dimensional DTW. Different from the popular one-
dimensional signal (such as speech signal), each pick-up signal in
our seing is multi-dimensional (6 dimensions in total including
3 dimensions for accelerometer and 3 dimensions for gyroscope),
which is a practical challenge for applying the DTW algorithm
to our system. In order to address this challenge, we develop a
weighted multi-dimensional DTW by carefully analyzing the dis-
tinguishing powers of different sensor dimensions.
Baseline Approach: We first consider an existing approach to
process multi-dimensional signals [33] with DTW as the baseline
approach. Consider two k-dimensional time-series signals X :=
[X1,X2, . . . ,Xk ] andY := [Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yk ], whereXi andYi are one
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Figure 3: e visualization of pick-up signals extracted from the accelerometer and gyroscope on three different dimensions.
We randomly select two pick-up signals from the same user (red solid and blue dashed dark lines) and a pick-up signal from
another user (green light lines). We observe that the distance between two pick-up signals corresponding to the same user is
smaller than that from a different user, which lays the foundation for our implicit authentication algorithm. We also observe
that different dimensions of sensors may have different powers to distinguish users. For instance, the accelerometer is better
than gyroscope in matching the same user’s pick-up signals and differentiating different user’s patterns, which demonstrates
the necessity of our proposed weighted multi-dimensional DTW algorithm.
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dimensional time-series signals for each i . Assuming that each di-
mensional signal is independent of each other, the DTW algorithm
under the multiple dimensions seing can be computed as the av-
erage over each dimension where
DTWk (X ,Y ) =
1
k
k∑
i=1
DTW1(Xi ,Yi ) (2)
WeightedMulti-dimensionalDTW:However, the above base-
line approach considers each dimensional signal as contributing
equally to the final matching performance, which is an unrealistic
assumption. In real world scenarios as in our seings, different di-
mensions corresponding to different sensors may have varying de-
grees of influence on the matching performance, since they reflect
different levels of a user’s behavioral characteristics. erefore, we
propose our weighted multi-dimensional DTW for discriminating
the distinguishing powers of different sensor dimensions as:
DTWk (X ,Y ) =
k∑
i=1
wiDTW1(Xi ,Yi ) (3)
wherewi is the weight for the i-th dimensional signal.
Figure 3 further demonstrates the various distinguishing power
for each sensor dimension. We randomly select two pick-up sig-
nals corresponding to the same user and one pick-up signal corre-
sponding to another user and compute the distance between these
signals aer implementing the one-dimensional DTW according
to Eq. 1. From Figure 3, we observe that the distance between two
pick-up signals corresponding to the same user is much smaller
than that from a different user, which lays the basic foundation for
our implicit authentication algorithm. We also observe that the
accelerometer is more powerful than the gyroscope in matching
the same user’s pick-up signals and differentiating different users’
pick-up signals, which demonstrates the empirical necessity of our
proposed weighted DTW algorithm. e reason is that a user’s
pick-up movement is dominated by the translation which is rele-
vant to the accelerometer, while the rotation relevant to the gyro-
scope is less significant.
We further analyze theweights for each dimension of accelerom-
eter and gyroscope by varying their weights from 0.1 to 0.9 on
the axis of x,y,z with summation equal to one. We observe that
when each dimension corresponding to the same sensor is equally
weighted, the overall authentication performance is the best (with
highest authentication accuracy). In addition, we also vary the
weights from 0.1 to 0.9 on the accelerometer and the gyroscope
with summation equal to one. We observe that the best perfor-
mance (highest authentication accuracy) is achieved when the ra-
tio between the weight of the accelerometer and that of the gyro-
scope is 0.6 to 0.4. Our observations further demonstrate that the
accelerometer is more informative than the gyroscope in improv-
ing the authentication performance.
In summary, our SPU system realizes implicit, lightweight and
in-device authentication for smartphone users, which consists of
sensor data collection, pick-up signal extraction andweightedmulti-
dimensional DTW processing. If the distance (computed by our
multi-dimensional DTW) between two time-series signals is close
enough (less than a threshold θ), the user passes the authentica-
tion and can have access to the smartphone. e detailed process
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Figure 4: e demographics of users in our experiments.
for selecting a proper distance threshold θ will be described in Sec-
tion 5.2.1.
4.3 System Updating
e updating process in previous authentication mechanisms usu-
ally involves retraining the authentication classifiers, which is com-
putationally complicated and typically requires additional comput-
ing power such as the use of cloud computing. In comparison, we
develop an efficient and lightweight updating process to accommo-
date the user’s pick-up behavioral dri over time.
Our system would automatically update the user’s profile in the
device whenever the user fails the implicit authentication but suc-
cessfully passes the subsequent explicit authentication. Our up-
dating process is implemented by averaging the currently stored
pick-up profile and the newly-detected pick-up signal. e key
challenge for this updating process is that the previous profile and
the newly-detected instance may not be of the same length. To
solve this problem, we utilize our multi-dimensional DTW algo-
rithm to first scale the two signals to the same length and then av-
erage them to obtain the updated user’s profile for future authen-
tication. We will show the effectiveness of our system updating
process in Section 5.2.
5 EXPERIMENTS
To verify the effectiveness of our SPU system, we carefully analyze
our collected data (as discussed in Section 3.2) and evaluate the
authentication performance of SPU under different experimental
scenarios and different system parameters. More specifically, the
objectives for our experimental analysis are: 1) to provide empiri-
cal confirmation of our system that people’s armmovements while
they pick up the smartphone can be utilized as a distinguishable
behavioral paern for authentication, as will be discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1; 2) to investigate the overall authentication performance
of SPU under real world usage scenarios, as will be discussed in
Section 5.2; 3) to understand the influence of different system pa-
rameters on our system, as will be discussed in Section 5.2.1; 4)
to verify the effectiveness of our system updating process (recall
Section 4.3), as will be discussed in Section 5.2.2; 5) to demonstrate
the robustness of our system in defending against various imper-
sonation aacks, as will be discussed in Section 5.3; 6) to verify
the necessity of combining the accelerometer and gyroscope in our
system, as will be discussed in Section 5.4.
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Figure 5: e heat map of applying weighted multi-dimensional DTW to our dataset. e average DTW distances between
different pick-up signals in 12 contexts is collected for all 24 users from (a) the same user, and (b) different users. We can see
that the DTW distances from the same user are much lower than that from different users, thus verifying the fundamental
intuitions of our proposed algorithm.
5.1 Fundamental Intuition for Our System
Our first experiment was conducted under a lab seing (as de-
scribed in Section 3.2), aiming to demonstrate the fundamental in-
tuition and empirical confirmation for our SPU system. In this ex-
periment, we asked each of the 24 users to pick up his/her smart-
phone in 6 different places while siing or standing and repeat
each movement for 10 iterations. Figure 4 shows the demograph-
ics of the 24 users in our experiments. e average age of the par-
ticipants is 34.3 years old while the median is 31 years old. ere
are 14 males and 10 females.
Aer extracting the pick-up signals according to Section 2.3,
we measure the distance between any two pick-up instances by
exploiting the weighted multi-dimensional DTW technique as de-
scribed in Section 4.2.2. In our algorithm, the weights for the ac-
celerometer signal and the gyroscope signal are selected as 0.6 and
0.4 respectively, and each of the 3 dimensions of the same sensor
is weighted equally (recall analysis in Section 4.2.2).
Figure 5(a) shows the average DTW distances of any two in-
stances of pick-up signals corresponding to the same user. Both
the x-axis and y-axis represent the 12 different pick-up scenar-
ios (6 different places and 2 user states, i.e., siing or standing).
Lighter squares represent smaller DTW distances. In Figure 5(a),
we observe the smallest DTWdistances along the diagonal squares
since they represent the distances between two pick-up signals cor-
responding to the same place and user state. By comparing the
diagonal squares and the non-diagonal squares in Figure 5(a), we
know the DTW distances across different pick-up scenarios do not
vary drastically, demonstrating the robustness of our system under
different context scenarios.
Figure 5(b) shows the average DTW distances of any two in-
stances of pick-up signals corresponding to different users. From
Figure 5, we observe that the DTW distances between pick-up sig-
nals corresponding to the same user are much lower than that be-
tween different users, which lays the fundamental intuition for our
system that utilizes users’ pick-up movements as distinguishable
behavioral paerns for authentication.
5.2 Realistic Usage Scenario
Our second experiment was conducted under a more realistic set-
ting, where the same 24 users (shown in Figure 4) were invited
to install our SPU application on their own smartphones and use
them freely in their normal lives for a week (7 days)4.
From the collected data, we extracted 3, 115 pick-up signals ac-
cording to Section 2.3. at is to say, we can detect 18.54 (i.e.,
3115/7/24) pick-up samples for each user per day (with standard
deviation 10.54). We also recorded the number of times users un-
lock their smartphones, which is 8, 736 in a week. erefore, the
average number of times each user unlocks his/her smartphone is
52 (i.e., 8736/7/24) per day (with standard deviation 27.31).
Note that our system does not detect all the movements when
the users try to unlock their smartphones, since we only extract
pick-up signals starting from a stable state. In our experiment, we
can detect 35.6% (i.e., 18.54/52, which correspond to the pick-up
signals starting from a stable state) of users’ pick-up movements
when they try to unlock their smartphones. erefore, we can
save more than one third of the time that users need to unlock
their smartphones explicitly. Furthermore, we also compute the
DTW distance between other types of pick-up signals (e.g., pick-
ing up the smartphone from a bag or from a pocket) to investigate
whether there are other pick-up paerns of users that can be uti-
lized for authentication. Our observations show that the distance
between other types of pick-up signals (not from a stable state)
corresponding to the same user is very large, demonstrating that
other types of pick-up signals can not be utilized as distinguish-
able paerns for user authentication. erefore, the pick-up move-
ments starting from a stable state which are extracted by our SPU
system, constitute the most important pick-up characteristics of
users. Our following experimental analysis are implemented on
these detected pick-up movement samples.
5.2.1 Determining the Distance Threshold. A significant chal-
lenge in implementing our system is how to select a proper value
for the distance threshold θ between the newly-detected pick-up
4We also let them use our application for another week for evaluating our system
updating mechanism as discussed in Section 5.2.2.
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Figure 6: (a) FAR, FRR and (b) accuracy, varying with differ-
ent distance threshold θ . We observe that when θ = 3.1, the
FRR is 0% and FAR is less than 10%. When θ = 2.8 the FRR is
7.6% and FAR is 0%, resulting in an authentication accuracy
higher than 96.3%. erefore, θ can tradeoff the usability of
our system (lower FRR) and users’ security (lower FAR)
signal and the stored pick-up profile of the user, which is an impor-
tant system parameter to balance the trade-off between the usabil-
ity of our system and the security of smartphone users. A smaller
θ provides higher security, while a larger θ would result in beer
usability.
Here, we utilize false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection
rate (FRR) asmetrics to quantify the authentication performance of
our system. FAR is the fraction of other users’ data that is misclas-
sified as the legitimate user’s. FRR is the fraction of the legitimate
user’s data that is misclassified as other users’ data. For security
protection, a large FAR is more harmful to the smartphone users
than a large FRR. However, a large FRR would degrade the conve-
nience of using our system. erefore, we aim to investigate the
influence of the distance threshold θ in balancing FAR and FRR, in
order to choose a proper θ for our system.
Figure 6(a) shows the FAR and FRR with varying values of the
distance threshold θ . We observe that FAR is less than 10% and
FRR is 0% when θ = 3.1. e FAR drops to 0% and FRR increases to
7.6% when θ = 2.8. erefore, θ is a trade-off between the usabil-
ity of our system (lower FRR) and the security of smartphone users
(lower FAR). In Figure 6(b), we observe that the authentication ac-
curacy is higher than 96.3% when θ is around 2.8. Combining Fig-
ure 6(a) and Figure 6(b), we choose θ = 2.8 in our experiments
from now on and in our published system, aiming at minimizing
FAR and maximizing the security of the smartphone users.
5.2.2 Incorporating the System Updating Process. In order to
verify the effectiveness of our system updating process as described
in Section 4.3, we let the same 24 users use their smartphones
freely for another week. More specifically, we randomly divided
the users into two groups. e 12 users in the first group installed
our SPUapplicationwhich incorporates the updating process, while
the other group installed another version of SPU without the up-
dating process. Aer careful analysis, we observed that the users
in the first group needed to explicitly unlock their smartphones (at
the same time, their pick-up profiles would be updated in the SPU
system) 17 times per day on average. For the other group without
system updating, the users needed to explicitly unlock their smart-
phones 35 times per day on average. We can see that incorporat-
ing the system updating process can further reduce 52% of times
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Figure 7: e FAR and FRR of SPU under various imperson-
ation attacks.
for users to unlock the smartphones. ese observations show the
effectiveness of our system updating process and the advantage of
our system in increasing smartphone users’ convenience.
5.3 Security Analysis
In our third experimental seing as described in Section 3.2, we
aim to evaluate how robust our SPU system is in defending against
various types of impersonation aackers (random aack, context-
aware aack and educated aack).
For each of the three aacks, we computed FAR and FRR curves
under different distance thresholds θ as shown in Figure 7, based
on which we have the following observations: 1) SPU can effec-
tively defend against random aacks. Here, ‘random’ aack indi-
cates a brute force aack where the aacker picks up the smart-
phone randomly without knowing any information about the vic-
tim. 2) When the distance threshold θ = 2.5, the FAR becomes 0%
for all the three aacks and the corresponding FRR is 18%. Note
that the FRR curve for the three aacks are the same since it eval-
uates the ratio that the victim is rejected by our system, which is
irrelevant to the aacker’s capability. 3) Furthermore, the user can
defend against different levels of aacks by adjusting the distance
threshold θ . ese results suggest that our SPU system is more
robust against random (brute force) aacks than other types of im-
personation aacks (context-aware aacks and educated aacks)
since these advanced aackers usually have access to partial infor-
mation about the user’s pick-up movements (recall Section 2.1 and
Section 3.2).
In summary, SPU can defend against most realistic aacks ro-
bustly and effectively. Even with a strong aacker (i.e., an insider
aacker), our system performs gracefully.
5.4 Further Experiments
We further demonstrate the necessity and advantages of combin-
ing the common sensors, acclerometer and gyroscope, in our SPU
system. In Table 1, we observe that using the combination of ac-
celerometer and gyroscope can achieve beer performance than
using each sensor individually, with the authentication accuracy
up to 96.3%. Furthermore, our SPU can reduce the number of ex-
plicit authentications a user must do by 32.9% (i.e., 35.6% × (1 −
7.6%)) on average, where 35.6% is the ratio of detected pick-up sig-
nals (recall Section 5.2) and 7.6% is the FRR by using the combina-
tion of accelerometer and gyroscope.
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Table 1: e authentication accuracy by using accelerometer and
gyroscope with distance threshold θ = 2.8.
Accuracy FAR FRR
Accelerometer 90.9 % 6.4% 11.8%
Gyroscope 85.2 % 13.7% 15.2%
Acc+Gyr 96.3 % 0% 7.6%
Table 2:eauthenticationaccuracy byusing threemotion sensors
with distance threshold θ = 2.8.
Accuracy FAR FRR
Magnetometer 36.7% 54.4% 62.4%
Acc+Mag 67.2% 37.2% 48.7%
Gyr+Mag 54.8% 41.9% 57.1%
All three sensors 72.5% 27.6% 34.4%
Next, we went a step further to investigate whether our SPU
system could benefit from more sensors than just the accelerom-
eter and gyroscope. More specifically, we analyze the authentica-
tion performance of SPU when incorporating the measurements
of a magnetometer and its combinations with the accelerometer
and gyroscope. We consider the magnetometer since we can con-
struct the popular 9-axis motion detector of the smartphone by
combining the 3-axis measurements of magnetometer with the 3-
axis measurements of each of accelerometer and gyroscope. An
interesting observation shown in Table 2 is that incorporating the
magnetometer into our SPU system does not improve the overall
authentication accuracy - in fact, it degrades the authentication
accuracy! Using more sensors is not always beer! e reason
is that the magnetic field is rather sensitive to the direction of the
smartphone, which makes it vary significantly when the same user
picks up the smartphone in different directions - thus degrading
the overall authentication performance.
ese observations substantiate our choice of using only the ac-
celerometer and gyroscope in our system.
6 OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
We now evaluate the system overhead of SPU on personal smart-
phones to demonstrate the applicability of our system in real world
scenarios. In our source code, the DTW algorithm is implemented
in the C language by using the Native Development Kit (NDK) in
Android 5.1. We test our system on a Google Nexus5 with 2.3GHz,
Krait 400 processor, 16GB internal storage and 2GB RAM, using
Android 5.1.
6.1 Power Consumption
ere are four different testing scenarios: 1) Phone is locked and
SPU is off; 2) Phone is locked and SPU keeps running; 3) Phone is
under use and SPU is off; 4) Phone is under use and SPU is running.
For cases 1) and 2), the test time is 12 hours each. We charge the
smartphone baery to 100% and check the baery level aer 12
hours. e average difference of baery charged level from 100%
is reported in Table 3. For cases 3) and 4), the phone under use
means that the user keeps unlocking and locking the phone. Dur-
ing the unlocked time, the user keeps typing notes. e period of
Table 3: e power consumption under four different scenarios.
Scenario
Power
Consumption
1) Phone locked, SPU off 1.1%
2) Phone locked, SPU on 2.9%
3) Phone unlocked periodically, SPU off 1.5%
4) Phone unlocked periodically, SPU on 3.5%
Figure 8: Cumulative distribution function of decision-
making time in SPU. We can find that more than 90% of
decision-making processes can be completed within 2 mil-
liseconds and all the processes can be finishedwithin 2.4mil-
liseconds.
unlocking and locking is two minutes and the test time in total is
60 minutes.
Table 3 shows the result of our power consumption test on bat-
tery usage. We find that in cases 1) and 2), the SPU-on mode con-
sumes 1.8% more baery power than the SPU-off mode each hour.
We believe the extra cost in baery consumption caused by SPU
will not affect user experience in daily use. For cases 3) and 4), SPU
consumes 2% more baery power performing 30 SPU implicit au-
thentications in one hour, which is also an acceptable cost for daily
usage.
6.2 Response Time
Figure 8 shows the cumulative distribution function of decision-
making time in SPU authentication. We find that more than 90%
of the decision-making computations can be completed within 2
milliseconds and all can be finished within 2.4 milliseconds. is
result shows that the latency caused by the SPU system for au-
thentication is low enough to be user-friendly and reasonable for
normal usage.
7 RELATED WORK
User authentication is one of the most important issues in smart-
phone security. Password-based authentication approaches are based
on possession of secret information, such as passwords or PINs.
Biometric-based approaches make use of distinct personal features,
such as fingerprint or iris paerns. Behavior-based authentica-
tion identifies a user based on his/her behavioral paern that is
observed by the smartphone. Compared with the password-based
and the biometric-based authentication, the behavior-based authen-
tication is more convenient for smartphone users with good re-
silience to forgery aacks.
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7.1 Password-based Authentication
e objective of most password-based authentication mechanisms,
e.g., PIN or passwords, is to secure the phone from unwanted ac-
cess. However, these methods require frequent participation of the
user. is oen leads to interruptions to the smartphone user, e.g.
continuously prompting him/her with some challenges. As a re-
sult, many smartphone users tend to completely remove such au-
thentication methods [35]. Our SPU system can overcome these
weaknesses, which increases the convenience for smartphone users
while guaranteeing their security, as shown in Section 5.
7.2 Biometric-based Authentication
Biometric-based authentications study static physical features of
humans. Currently, there are many different physiological biomet-
rics for authentication, such as face paerns, fingerprints [13], and
iris paerns [28]. Biometric-based authentication systems involve
an enrollment phase and an authentication phase. A user is en-
rolled by providing his/her biological data such as fingerprint or
iris paern. e system extracts these paerns from the provided
data and stores the extracted paerns for future reference. Dur-
ing the authentication phase, the system compares the observed
biological data against the stored data to authenticate a user.
However, biometric-based authentications also require frequent
user participation, and hence is also an explicit authenticationmech-
anism. For example, fingerprint authentication always requires
the user to put his/her finger on the fingerprint scanner. On av-
erage, the response time is longer than 1 second [27], which is also
much longer than the 2.4 milliseconds of our SPU system. Hence,
unlike our implicit SPU authentication, these biometric-based ap-
proaches requiring user compliance are not as convenient as our
SPU system.
7.3 Behavior-based Authentication
Another thread of authentication researchmeasures the behavioral
paerns of the user, where a user is identified based on his/her
behavioral paerns, such as hand-writing paern [10, 38], gait [26]
and GPS location paerns [4].
With the increasing development of mobile sensing technology,
collecting measurements through sensors built within the smart-
phone and other devices is now becoming not only possible, but
quite easy through, for example, Android sensor APIs. Mobile
sensing applications, such as the CMU MobiSens[41], run as ser-
vices in the background and can constantly collect sensors’ data
from smartphones. Sensors can be either hard sensors (e.g., ac-
celerometers) that are physically-sensing devices, or so sensors
that record information of a phone’s running status (e.g., screen
on/off). erefore, sensor-based implicit authentication mecha-
nisms have becomevery popular and applicable for behavior-based
authentication.
In [4], an n-gram geo-based model is proposed for modeling a
user’s mobility paern. ey use the GPS sensor to detect abnor-
mal activities (e.g., a phone being stolen) by analyzing a user’s loca-
tion history, and their algorithm can achieve 86.6% accuracy. How-
ever, the access to GPS require users’ permissions, and cannot be
done implicitly.
Nickel et al. [26] exploited a user’s walking paern to authen-
ticate a smartphone user by using the k-NN algorithm. Conti et
al. [6] utilized the user’smovement of answering a phone call to au-
thenticate a smartphone user. Shrestha et al.[34] utilized a tapping
paern to authenticate a user when the user does an NFC trans-
action. However, their experiments had strict restrictions on the
users’ behavior where the users have to walk or answer a phone
call following a specific script (e.g., walk straight ahead at the same
speed [26] or answer the phone which is on a table in front of a
user [6]). ese restrictions are impractical for a real use.
Users’ behavior on a touch screen is one of the most popular
research directions in behavior-based authentication [3, 10, 19, 31,
38]. Trojahn et al. [38] developed a mixture of a keystroke-based
and a handwriting-based method to realize authentication by using
the screen sensor. eir approach has achieved 11% FAR and 16%
FRR. Frank et al. [10] studied the correlation between 22 analytic
features from touchscreen traces and classified these features us-
ing k-NN and SVM. Li et al. [19] proposed another behavior-based
authentication method where they exploited five basic movements
(sliding up, down, right, le and tapping) and their related combi-
nations, as the user’s behavioral paern features, to perform au-
thentication. However, touch screen based authentications may
suffer from a simple robotic aack [30].
SenSec [43] constantly collects data from the accelerometer, gy-
roscope and magnetometer, to construct gesture models while the
user is using the device. SenSec has shown that it can achieve 75%
accuracy in identifying owners and 71.3% accuracy in detecting
the adversaries. Lee et al. [18] monitored the users’ general behav-
ioral paerns and utilized SVM techniques for user authentication.
eir results show that the authentication accuracy can be higher
than 90% by using a combination of sensors. However, these meth-
ods require a large amount of privacy sensitive training data from
other users, and significant external computation power for learn-
ing the behavior models, unlike our in-device SPU authentication
method.
In fact, almost all the existing behavior-based authentication
mechanisms [4, 10, 18, 19, 26, 38, 43] heavily rely on a powerful
remote server to share the tasks and take a relatively long time
to complete the authentication process. In comparison, our SPU
is a lightweight, in-device, non-intrusive and automatic-learning
authentication system, which would increase the convenience for
smartphone users while enhancing their security.
8 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our SPU system increases the convenience for smartphone users
while enhancing their security. We will make SPU open source
soware, suitable for extensions with future research and experi-
ments.
Future research can include more context-detection techniques
to detect fine-grained pick-up paerns for users and embed it with
SPU to further increase the convenience and security for smart-
phone users.
Users’ pick-up paerns may vary when they are using other
types of devices, e.g., tablets or smartwatches. It would be an in-
teresting future direction to extend SPU to these mobile devices.
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Furthermore, the combination of multiple devices may possibly
provide beer authentication performance for the SPU system.
9 CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel system, Secure Pick Up (SPU), to implicitly
authenticate smartphone users in a lightweight, in-device, non-
intrusive and automatic-learning manner. Unlike previous work,
SPU does not require a large amount of training data (especially
those of other users) or any additional computational power from
a remote server, which makes it more deployable and desirable for
many users.
Our key insight is that the user’s phone pick-up paern is dis-
tinguishable from others, using smartphone sensor measurements.
We propose a weighted multi-dimensional dynamic time warping
algorithm to effectively measure the distance between pick-up sig-
nals in order to determine the legitimate user versus others.
Extensive experimental analysis shows that our system achieves
authentication accuracy up to 96.3% with negligible system over-
head (2% power consumption). Furthermore, our evaluation shows
that SPU can reduce by 32.9% the number of explicit authentica-
tions a user must do, and can defend against various imperson-
ation aacks effectively. Overall, SPU offers a novel feature in the
design of today’s smartphone authentication and provides users
with more options in balancing the security and convenience of
their devices.
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